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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze how income, stock market, and interest rate risk affect the
purchase of life insurance and pension annuities over the life cycle in a continuous
time setting. We expand prior literature on pension annuities and life insurance by
simultaneously considering income, stock market, and interest rate risk as the main
sources of uncertainty over the life cycle apart from mortality risk. Mortality risk
has two different outcomes. On the one hand, the investor can run out of savings
and fall into poverty before dying. In this case, the investor can neither consume
nor bequeath her heirs (longevity risk). On the other hand, the investor can die too
early without consuming enough of her savings in case she has not a bequest motive
or she can perish without having built up sufficient wealth to leave an appropriate
legacy for her heirs. The latter is also known as brevity risk.
While in the past only wealthy individuals were concerned with personal financial
planning, today everyone has to accumulate wealth and manage her assets effectively
to meet the consumption and bequest liabilities that arise during her lifetime. Per-
sonal finance particularly becomes critical for everyone’s individual welfare in light
of the demographic shifts eroding and undermining public PAYGO systems. Until
recently several employers have taken on longevity and investment risk by providing
defined benefit solutions to their workers. Today’s employees have to increasingly
bear the investment risk when electing a certain defined contribution 401k plan
from their employer’s menu. Ideal candidates for the efficient management of con-
sumption (bequest-) liabilities are pension annuities (life insurance). Both products
have appealing return and payoff characteristics since their pricing is either con-
tingent on surviving (pension annuities) or on dying (life insurance). Compared
to an investment in mutual funds, the consumption possibilities are higher when
annuitizing, while the bequest potential increases when purchasing life insurance.
In case the individual annuitizes, the investor surrenders bequest potential, while
the investor gives up consumption possibilities when purchasing life insurance. If
the investor purchases a life insurance, the premium is taken out of the investor’s
financial wealth. As already demonstrated by Richard (1975), the investor controls
her legacy by finding the right balance between savings and life insurance early in
1
life and seeks the appropriate split between financial wealth and pension annuities
during the later stage of her life cycle. So the key point of interest is to know when
the investor should switch from life insurance to pension annuities in order to satisfy
both her desire to consume and her wish to bequeath her heirs and what wealth level
triggers the short position in life insurance.
Even though the selection of life insurance and pension annuities is a challenging
task in a world where mortality is the sole source of risk (see Yaari, 1965 or Pliska
and Ye, 2007), there are many other sources of risk influencing both the timing
and the extent to which life insurance and pension annuities are purchased. Labor
income is probably the most influential exogenous factor determining the timing
of pension annuities (see e.g. Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos, 2008a). By the same
token, labor income also influences the level of savings and therefore the overall
demand for life insurance.
Not only does labor income have a considerable impact on the purchase of life
insurance and pension annuities, but the influence on the asset allocation within
the investor’s financial wealth is also considerable. Studies such as Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005), Duffie, Fleming, Soner, and Zariphopoulou (1997), Gomes
and Michaelides (2005), Heaton and Lucas (1997), Koo (1998), Viceira (2001), and
several more consider stochastic income. Several of these studies find labor income
to be more closely related to bonds than to stocks. Therefore, human capital acts
partly as a substitute for bonds. In turn, the optimal stock fraction of financial
wealth decreases over the life cycle as the fraction of human capital declines in the
investor’s total augmented wealth. Augmented wealth is composed of both financial
wealth and human capital. This is why we pay particular attention to modeling the
investor’s labor income.
Correlation between the innovations of the stock return and the income growth
had only a limited impact on the overall asset allocation because previous studies
considered a single risky asset and a constant investment opportunity set. Munk
and Sørensen (2007) show that correlation particularly matters if the investor faces
a stochastic investment opportunity set with correlated interest rate risk.
There are numerous other studies looking only at interest rate risk in isolation.
Other studies analyzing dynamic asset allocation in the presence of interest rate
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risk include Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado (1997), Campbell and Viceira (2001),
Deelstra, Graselli and Koehl (2000), Liu (2007), Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005),
and many more. Since the interest rate dynamics are also important for determining
the value of the investor’s human capital, we find it particularly interesting to analyze
its impact on the decision when to buy pension annuities and when to purchase life
insurance.
Indeed, the literature on life insurance and pension annuities is vast. Early work
on life insurance in a financial context includes Campbell (1980), Fischer (1973),
Hakansson (1969), Hurd (1989), Lewis (1989), Yaari (1965). While previous stud-
ies analyze in which way mortality, utility, strength of bequest, risk aversion, and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution influence the demand for life insurance, the
articles are not written in the spirit of modern portfolio choice models.
In many studies, pension annuities are analyzed separately as most products
involve life long payments. For portfolio choice studies including gradual annuitiza-
tion only we refer the interested reader to Milevsky and Young (2007) and Horneff,
Maurer, and Stamos (2008a, 2008b)
Only a few articles consider the timing of life insurance and pension annuities
simultaneously. Richard (1975) is a pioneering study modeling life insurance in the
framework of modern portfolio choice. Dybvig and Liu (2004) consider a model with
flexible retirement dates by endogenizing the leisure decision while the investor can
purchase life insurance and pension annuities. Huang, Milevsky, and Wang (2005)
as well as Huang and Milevsky (2008) consider a consumption function including
the bread winner and her respective heirs, where the model includes the bread win-
ner’s risky labor income and stochastic capital markets. Pliska and Ye (2007) model
an economy with no risk sources except the uncertainty surrounding the investor’s
remaining lifetime. However, their study looks at pre-retirement behavior only. Pur-
cal (2003) analyzes the interaction of life insurance and unspanned income in the
presence of a stochastic stock market. Kraft and Steffensen (2008) generalize the
Richard’s (1975) results by assuming a multistage Markovian framework including
uncertain lifetime and disability but they do not consider capital market risks and
therefore disregard the individual’s investment decision. In essence, we extend the
analysis of Munk and Sørensen (2007) to uncertain lifetime and insurance products
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and the article by Richard (1975) to stochastic labor income and interest rate risk
by using Pliska and Ye’s (2007) model which only considers riskless bonds and life
insurance. Compared to Huang and Milevsky (2008), we assume an age dependent
income process and introduce interest rate risk. Interest rate risk is important be-
cause it influences the demand for mortality contingent claims, expands the stochas-
tic investment opportunity set for capital markets, and influences the pattern of the
labor income process.
First, we develop our stochastic model before we analyze the case of spanned in-
come. Then we proceed to the case of unspanned income. A final chapter concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Uncertain Lifetime and Preferences
We assume that the investor is alive at time t = 0 and the investor’s age at death
(lifetime) is a non-negative continuous random variable T on the probability space
(Ω,F , P ) (c.f. to Pliska and Ye, 2007). In our model, we suppose that the random
variable T has a probability distribution with underlying probability density function
f̄(t) and a cumulative distribution function F̄ (t):




The function S(t) is also known as the survivor function and is therefore defined as
the probability that the age at death (survival time) is greater than or equal to t:
S(t) = P (T ≥ t)) = 1− F̄ (t). (2)
The survivor function can be used to compute the probability that the individual
lives from time zero to some time beyond t. The force of mortality or hazard rate
is the instantaneous ’death rate’ for the investor when she has survived until time t
and is given by:
λ(t) ≡ lim
∆t→0


















In the remainder, we use a parametric function for the force of moratlity. We choose
the Makeham-Gompertz law of mortality because of its widespread use in the finance










The parameters ϑ, ξ, and χ determine the shape of the force of mortality function.
While ξ is the mode of the remaining lifetime, the parameter χ can be interpreted
as a dispersion parameter of the distribution. The constant ϑ aims at capturing the
component of the death rate that can be attributed to accidents. The exponentially
increasing portion of (5) reflects natural causes of death over the life cycle.
Under the risk neutral measure λt turns out to be equal to the hazard rate µt.
Interestingly, the hazard rate µt is used by the insurance companies to price their
products. Therefore, the heterogeneous beliefs about individual survival probabili-
ties affect the value of human capital in the market place.1
In the setup of our optimization problem, we are concerned with maximizing the
investor’s expected utility from lifetime consumption U(ct, t), from bequest V (υt, t),
and from final wealth L(Wω, ω). Here, ω represents the truncated lifetime and can
be interpreted as the last year of financial planning during the investor’s life. In
turn, the indirect utility function J is given by:












where cs denotes the consumption at time s, υT is the legacy the investor leaves at
death, and Wω is the final wealth.
1Insurance companies usually assume a different mortality table to adjust the survival probabilities
to reflect adverse selection. While λt is used to weight the utility from consumption and bequest
potential in the optimization problem, µt describes the force of mortality used to price insurance
products.
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The optimization problem is dependent on several state variables such as the
level of cash on hand W , income y, the short rate r, and age t. The state variable
cash on hand W can be influenced by the controls consumption c, stock investment
θQ, bond holdings θB, cash or money market holdings θM , and the amount of life
insurance x. The controls are both time and state dependent.
We have to include the final wealth or cash on hand Wω in order to find a closed
form solution for our problem.
Richard (1975) chooses an artificial terminal condition for his optimization prob-
lem. In his case, the integral for determining the indirect utility function is not
defined at the very end because the integrand becomes infinite. Technically, the
resulting closed form expression is not the solution to the stated optimization prob-
lem. Yet, there are different ways of addressing this issue. For instance, Pliska and
Ye (2007) state their problem in a mathematically correct manner by introducing
some fixed investment horizon. They interpret this particular point in time as the
beginning of the retirement period.2 If the investor considered in Pliska and Ye
(2007) lives up to her terminal date, she is granted the remaining wealth for the
periods to come. We have also thought of another solution to the problem in as
much as we can assume that the investor leaves neither bequest nor wealth to live
on for the periods after the financial planning horizon. The resulting solution would
be very similar to the one of Richard’s (1975) article.3 However, we prefer the final
wealth condition as it appears to be more economically sound. Most probably, the
investor is happy to receive a lump sum to cover her care giving expenses at the
very end of the financial planning horizon.
In the literature, Dybvig and Liu (2004), for instance, evade any problems re-
lated to the indirect utility function by using a fixed hazard rate. However, a fixed
hazard rate is a questionable assumption both from an economic and biological
standpoint as the investor cannot age in their model and has the same expected
lifetime throughout her entire existence. Huang, Milevsky, and Wang (2005), for ex-
ample, avoid the bequest completely by modeling a consumption function including
the bread winner as well as her heirs.
Turning to our original problem, we can rewrite (6) in the following way because
2A detailed derivation can be found in Ye (2006).
3The results of this alternative problem are available upon request.
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we assume that T is independent of the filtration F:






























Applying Fubini Tonelli’s theorem and swapping the order of integration, we get:









[U(cs, s)ds+ λ(s)V (υs, s)] ds
+S(ω)
S(t)




In the remainder, we assume that the investor has CRRA preferences for consump-
tion, bequest, and final wealth.
U(ct, t) = m(t)
c1−γt
1−γ , V (υt, t) = m(t)
υ1−γt
1−γ , L(Wω, ω) = m(ω)
W 1−γω
1−γ , (9)
where γ is the level of risk aversion which is greater than one. The subjective
discount rate m(t) is equal to e−ϕt, where the rate of time preference is ϕ.
In the following sections, we will define the dynamics of each state variable
separately. One state variable can be omitted because of scale independence. Later
on, we will reduce the state space to normalized cash on hand as an income multiple,
the level of the short rate r, and age t.
For now, we consider the state variable cash on hand W before normalization
because we want to express the short positions in terms of absolute values rather
than relative figures.
2.2 Financial Markets
The bond market is modeled according to Vasicek (1977) in which the short rate
spans the whole term structure of interest rates.
dr = κ(r̄ − rt)dt− σrdzr, (10)
where κ determines the speed driving the current short rate rt to its long run mean r̄
and where zr is a one dimensional standard Brownian motion and σr is the volatility
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of the short rate process. The price of a zero bond Bst can be represented by an
affine function:
Bst ≡ Bs(rt, t) = e−a(s−t)−b(s−t)rt , (11)


















where τ determines the time to maturity of a bond at time t, R∞ is the asymptotic
long rate representing the yield of a zero coupon bond as maturity goes to infinity,
and φr is the market price of risk. The dynamics of the bond price can be stated as:
dBt
Bt
= (rt + σB(rt, t)φr)dt+ σB(rt, t)dzr, (13)
where σB(rt, t) is the bond return volatility. In general, the bond return volatility
depends on both the level of the short rate and the time-to-maturity. In this model,
the bond return has a perfect negative instantaneous correlation with the interest
rate ρBr = −1. Even though the affine interest model has only one source of
uncertainty, the Vasicek model allows for all shapes of term structures observed
empirically: normal, flat, and inverted term structures.
As far as stock markets are concerned, we assume that the individual can invest




= (rt + ψ)dt+ σQ(ρQBdzr +
√
1− ρ2QBdzQ) (14)
The expected return on equity is equal to rt plus the constant equity premium
ψ. The innovations of the stock and the bond process are correlated where the
correlation is given by ρQB. Here, σQ represents the volatility of the stock return.
To simplify the notation for the sections to come, we combine the bond and stock
price dynamics in Pt = (Bt, Qt)T by using matrix notation. We have to multiply
the lower triangular matrix found by Cholesky decomposition by the vector of the
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dPt = diag(Pt)[(rt1 + Σ(rt, t)Φ)dt+ Σ(rt, t)dZt], (16)
where Φ = (φr, φQ)T is the vector of market risk premiums and φQ is the market











In the insurance market used in this model, the investor can buy or sell instantaneous
term life insurance as in Richard (1975). Instantaneous term life insurance means
that the investor can only purchase death insurance for the next second. The investor
has to pay a premium of xt to ensure that her heirs receive an amount of xtµt at her
death, where µt is the hazard rate the insurance company uses to price the term life
insurance:
µt = λt + ιt, (18)
where ι is the incremental load factor increasing the standard hazard rate at time





where D are the total costs. If the investor dies immediately, her heirs receive
her accumulated cash on hand plus the payout from the instantaneous term life
insurance as a legacy υt.




whereWt is the cash on hand. Again, we show the dynamics ofWt after introducing
all other decision and state variables. Surviving the next second, the investor has to
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repurchase instantaneous term life insurance in order to hedge the liability arising
from her bequest motive for the following second. Indeed, life insurance is cheap
for a wage earner. Here is an example: The US female investor is 35 years old
and she has just purchased a life insurance for USD 100. Her hazard rate is 0.265
percent at that time. In turn, her death benefit amounts to USD 37,736. So we
do not expect an extensively large cash outflow for life insurance at the early stage
of her life cycle. Only a small fraction of her wealth goes towards funding the
additional legacy. Modeling life insurance in this way does not only cover death
insurance but also annuities. Theoretically, death insurance is just the flip side of
an annuity. The investor has to pay a premium when she is alive while her heirs
receive a death benefit in case she perishes. If the investor shorts the term life
insurance, she will receive the premium as a benefit when she is alive and will have
to pay the death benefit as the annuity premium from her legacy. In real world, a
life annuity is a financial contract between a buyer (annuitant) and a seller (insurer)
that pays out a periodic amount for as long as the buyer is alive, in exchange for
an initial premium (Brown et al., 2001). However, there is a similar product out
in the insurance market known as reverse mortgage. A reverse mortgage works as
follows: A reverse mortgage is used to release the home equity in a property as a
loan given in multiple payments to the home owner. Indeed, the multiple payments
can be a life annuity spelling out how much the house owner receives for as long
as she stays alive. The homeowner’s obligation is deferred until the owner dies. So
the premium is paid only at death. The home equity value works as collateral for
the remaining time. Still the annuity payments are life long to limit the adverse
selection in the insurance market (see Brugiavini, 1993). Arguably one cannot find
the exact same payoff structure of short positions in term life insurance in real life.
However, it works as an excellent simplification and shows similar characteristics
of a reverse mortgage with life annuity payments. In turn, the introduction of life
long payments necessitates the numerical solution of a combined optimal control
and stopping time problem (see Milevsky and Young, 2007).
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2.4 Labor Income
In the remainder, we use a tractable model of labor income by assuming that the in-
vestor as a wage earner receives a continuous non-negative income from non-financial
sources throughout her lifetime. The income rate is yt at time t. Identical to Munk








(1− ρ2yB − ρ̂2yQ)dzy
]]
for t ∈ [0,min{ω, T}],
(21)
where ζ0 is the time dependent drift term and ζ1 denotes the the sensitivity of the
wage rate with respect to the short rate. Here zy is a one-dimensional standard
Brownian motion, ρyP = (ρyB, ρ̂yQ)





The coefficients in front of the standard Brownian motions can be found by applying
the Cholesky-Crout algorithm to the covariance matrix. The drift term of the income
process is also influenced by the level of the short rate to reflect the impact of the
business cycles on the general wage level.
3 Spanned Income
3.1 Optimal Policies
In order to derive the optimal policies for the individual, we need to consider the
dynamic budget constraint. The holdings in the money market account θM are given
as the residual after subtracting other investments from the current cash on hand
defined below. The residual value is determined by θM = Wt − θQ − θB. Given the
optimal consumption, investment, and insurance strategy, the wealth evolution can
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be written as:
dWt = (Wtrt + Θ
TΣ(rt, t)Φ− ct − xt + yt)dt+ ΘTΣ(rt, t)dz
for t ∈ [0,min{ω, T}],
(23)
where Θ = (θB, θQ)T . Applying Ito’s Lemma to (8), we find the following Hamilton-




U(ct, t) + λtV (υt, t) + Jt + JW [rtWt + Θ




TΣΣTΘ + Jrκ[r̄ − rt] + 12Jrrσ
2




2σ2y − JWrΘTΣe1σr + JWyyσyΘTΣρyP + Jryyρyrσyσr } ,
(24)
where e1 = (1, 0)T and the terminal condition is J(W, y, r, ω) = L(W,ω).
The first order condition with respect to consumption is the typical standard
envelope condition: the incremental utility from saving cash on hand is equal to
the incremental value of consuming cash on hand immediately. A similar envelope
condition holds for the bequest.
U ′(ct) = JW (Wt, yt, rt, t)
λt
µt
· V ′(υt) = JW (Wt, yt, rt, t).
(25)
The individual purchases as much insurance from the current cash on hand as nec-
essary to equate the incremental utility increase relative to the gain of having more
cash on hand available for future periods to come. It is a surprising but well known
result that the new asset class life insurance is more closely related to the optimal
consumption strategy than it is to alternative investment strategies such as stocks,
bonds, and money market. The optimality condition suggests that the individual
reacts to changes in the state variables. Solving for the optimal consumption rate












The optimal investment strategy is given by:












The first part of the optimal investment controls corresponds to the standard mean-
variance optimal portfolio. The second term of (27) refers to the hedge against
variations of the income, while the last part of the optimal control stems from the
hedge against interest rate changes. Given the optimality conditions, we can exactly
determine the controls for a certain (W, y, r, t) quadruple in the state space if we
obtain a functional expression for J(W, y, r, t). The value function is homogeneous
of the degree (1− γ) in wealth. In case of the Vasicek interest rate specification, a
closed form solution can be found. Whenever income is spanned and no portfolio
constraints are in place, income can be replicated by financial assets. The present
value of future income is simply considered as part of the investor’s augmented
wealth. The individual has a total augmented wealth of Wt +H(yt, rt, t). Here, the









Due to the CRRA function and the assumptions made previously, we can write the
indirect utility function with labor income as:
J(W, y, r, t) = J(W +H(y, r, t), r, t). (29)
J(W, y, r, t) =
1
1− γ
m(t)g(r, t)γ(W +H(y, r, t))1−γ. (30)
In addition, we can propose the following guess (30) for the function J(W, y, r, t).
What remains to be done is to find a functional expression for g(r, t) and to price the
individual’s income. First, we derive the function g(r, t) for our guess in equation
(30) in appendix (A) Value Function. We also price the income stream under the
risk neutral measure (see appendix (B) Human Capital for details). The function
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where τ̂ is the time horizon. The function g(r, t) looks similar to a bond pricing
formula. The first part is scaled by the time dependent coefficients k(s) and f(τ̂),
and nonlinearly transformed by γ−1
γ
. The last part of the sum is multiplied by the
function f(τ̂) only, while the zero bond Bω is raised to the power of γ−1
γ
.





















ζ0(u)− σy(u)ρTyPΦ− (ζ1 − 1)σy(u)ρyBσrb(s− u)
)
du








where S̄ is the survivor function including the hazard rate under the risk neutral
measure. Human capital shows similarity to a defaultable bond. The bond price
has been scaled by the function h(t, s) and transformed by (1− ζ1).
3.2 Optimal Demand for Life Insurance or Pension Annuity
Even though the closed form solution is found for the special case when income
can be replicated by financial assets, it is instructive to analyze the solution more
carefully to gain some economic insight.
Equation (33) shows that the optimal insurance demand does not only depend
on all four state variables (W, y, r, t) but also on all parameters involved in the
entire optimization problem. Augmented wealth and the function g(r, t) determine
the optimal insurance strategy to a large extent. The overall absolute insurance
demand heavily depends on the weights assigned by the hazard rate µ to price the
14
life insurance. The older the investor and the higher the hazard rate is, the larger






γ Wt +H(y, r, t)
g(r, t)
− µtWt. (33)
The value of x∗ can be positive or negative. If the sign of x∗ is negative, the individual
has a positive demand for pension annuities. The demand for pension annuities will







γ Wt +H(y, r, t)
g(r, t)
< µtWt. (34)
Wealth has to be larger than the scaled value of augmented wealth consisting of
human capital and financial wealth. The annuity demand becomes greater whenever
eitherWt rises or the value of human capital declines. In general it is not clear which
effect the short rate has on the demand for life insurance because in equation (33
the nominator as well as the denominator are dependent on the short rate. For two
cases, the direction is obvious. If the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ > 1 and
the short rate sensitivity of the wage rate ζ1 < 1, than the demand for life insurance
decreases for increasing short rates. Further, if γ > 1 and ζ1 > 1, than the demand
for life insurance is increasing for rising short rates.
4 Unspanned Income
4.1 Optimal Policies
For computational convenience only, we rewrite the HJB from (24) by considering
the following changes: First, we take the rate of time preference ϕ to the left hand









Third, we replace the final condition by J(W, y, r, ω) = Wω
1−ρ
1−ρ . The new HJB is in
line with Purcal (2003) and similar to the one used in Milevsky and Young (2007).
Since we use CRRA utility, we find that the utility function is homogeneous of
degree 1− γ in (W , y) and therefore we can rewrite the indirect utility function as:







We define η as the wealth-to-income ratio W
y
and express controls c and x normalized
with income as ĉ and x̂. In order to give some illustrative examples for the case of
unspanned income, we have to solve and optimize the PDE in (37) after replacing
the indirect utility function J(W, r, y, t) by F (η, r, t).
((λt + ϕ)− (1− γ)(ζ0 + ζ1r) + 12γ(1− γ)σ
2
y) F = sup
(ĉ,Π,x̂)
{
Ū(ĉ, t) + λtV̄ (υ̂, t)
+Ft + Fr(κ[r̄ − r] + (1− γ)ρyrσyσr] + Fη([1− ĉ− x̂+ rη + ηΠTΣΦ]
−ζ0η − ζ1rη + γησ2y − γησyΠTΣρyP ) + 12η
2Fηη[Π





r − ηFηrσr(ΠTΣe1 + ρyrσy) } ,
(37)
where Π is the vector of portfolio weights. We also stipulate that the bond and equity
weights have to add up to one (πQ + πB = 1) to avoid excessive money market
borrowings. We optimize and solve the HJB (37) by adopting the optimization
method used in Brennan et al. (1997).4
4.2 Calibration
We calibrate our entire model to asset returns, income profiles, and survival proba-
bilities found in US data. In our stylized analysis, we assume symmetric mortality
beliefs µt=λt by fitting the standard hazard rate λ to the 2000 Population Ba-
sic mortality table for US females. Applying non-linear least square, we fit the
Makeham-Gompertz force of mortality so that the estimated parameters turn out
to be ξ = 87.24, χ = 10.54, and ϑ = 0.001. In terms of the preference function, we
choose a moderately risk averse investor with a coefficient of risk aversion equal to
γ = 4. Her rate of time preference is ϕ = 0.03.
4Greater detail on the numerical methods can be found in Appendix C.
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Parameters
Utility Interest Rate Stocks Income Covariance
B Q Y
ξ 87.24 κ 0.5 ψ 0.04 ζ̄0 0.025 σ2B 0 0
χ 10.54 r̄ 0.02 σQ 0.2 ζ1 0.25 0 σ2Q 0
ϑ 0.001 φr 0 σy 0.1 0 0 σ2y
ϕ 0.03 σr 0.02
γ 4
Table 1: Parameters and Calibration. This table specifies the parameters of the
utility function, the hazard rate, interest model, stock, and income process.
In order to incorporate life-cycle variations in labor income, we consider an age-
dependent income growth rate. The expected growth rate ζ̄0 is 2.5 percent per year
as long as the investor works. However, if the level of the short rate is equal to 10
percent, then the income rate doubles to 5 percent because we set ζ1 acting as a
business cycle indicator to 0.25. When the investor enters retirement, the income
growth rate ζ̄0 drops to 0 percent. Along these lines, we assume that the income
volatility is equal to 10 percent during worklife while the volatility becomes zero at
the beginning of the retirement period.
ζ0(t) =
ζ̄0(t) if 20 ≤ t ≤ 650 if t > 65 (38)
Our benchmark parameters for the stock market are in line with Cocco, Gomes,
and Maenhout (2005), Gomes and Michealides (2005) as well as Munk and Sørensen
(2007) and many others. The risk premium of ψ = 4 percent is frequently quoted
in the literature and reflects the forward looking equity premium over the risk free
rate. In our model the risk free rate is equal to the short rate model given by the
Vasicek term structure model. The standard deviation for the stock price is set at
20 percent. This falls into the range of historical volatilities found for major US
stock market indexes such as the S&P500.
The parameters for the short rate process are taken from Munk and Sørensen
(2007) as there is no sufficient data on real bonds available. The speed κ to the long
term mean is exactly 50 percent. The standard deviation of the short rate process
and the long term short rate are set to 2 percent respectively. We assume a market
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price of risk φr = 0. For our numerical analysis, we also suppose that the investor
can only access a 10 year government bond paying real interest.5
We set the correlations of the innovations between the financial and non-financial
growth rates ρBy=ρQy = 0 to zero in order to avoid covariance effects in our analysis.
The same is true for the correlation between the innovations of stock and bond
returns ρQB = 0.
4.3 Numerical Illustration of Insurance Demand
In this section, we illustrate the demand for life insurance and pension annuities over
the life cycle. Graph (A) of figure (1) depicts the long and short positions in life
insurance as fractions of η. Not surprisingly do life insurances play an important role
for small levels of cash on hand. The higher the level of cash on hand, the more is
the investor induced to switch to short positions because she has sufficient financial
wealth levels in order to bequeath her heirs. The overall insurance demand changes
considerably over the life cycle. The total fraction used for life insurance purchases
and pension annuities early in life is still limited. This is because premiums of life
insurances are extremely cheap as we have seen in the section on insurance markets.
On the flip side, short positions are very expensive because they limit the bequest
potential which is not sufficiently backed by financial savings. When the investor
becomes older, she purchases substantially more pension annuities by shortening life
insurance. At the late stage of her life cycle, the investor buys more life contingent
products with a higher fraction of η than before because she is more likely to die the
next period. Graph (B) of figure (1) shows the insurance demand for an 80 year old
female investor along the dimensions normalized cash on hand and short rate level.
We find only a marginal influence of the short rate level on the overall demand of
life insurance under the current parameterizations of our asset and income model.
Probably one reason can be found in the way we model the business cycle effects on
income. In our model, the short rate also influences the growth rate of our income
process during the retirement period. Here we have offsetting effects because the
short rate enters human capital as well as the value function. The numerical analysis






























































































Figure 1: Demand for Pension Annuities and Life Insurance. Graph (A) and
(B) assume the parameters from table (1) and uses the optimization given in (37). Graph
(A) displays the insurance demand as a fraction of η over the life cycle. The short rate is
assumed to be 3.25 percent. Graph (B) shows the insurance demand as a fraction of η for
a female investor of age 80.
Source: Author’s computations
deviates from the analytical analysis because we assume zero correlation between
the innovations of financial and non-financial growth rates.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we solve a life cycle model with life insurance and pension annuities
analytically for the complete market case. Our model assumes a stochastic wage
earner with CRRA preferences whose lifetime is random. The investor has to decide
among short and long positions in life insurance, stocks, bonds, and money market
investment when facing a risky stock market and interest rate risk. We also derive
some numerical insight into a realistically calibrated case when income is unspanned.
The optimal life annuity demand depends on all state variables (wealth, income,
short rate, and age) as well as all parameters under consideration. The insurance
demand is particularly dependent on age. The older the individual, the higher the
hazard rate, the greater the absolute demand for life insurance products. The lower
the investor’s human capital and the higher her financial wealth is, the more likely
the investor shifts from life insurance into pension annuities. We find a substantial
impact of normalized cash on hand with respect to the insurance rules but we dis-
cover a considerably small influence of the short rate on the demand of life insurance
if we reasonably calibrate our asset and income model.
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6 Appendix (A): Value Function
Using the fact that the utility function is homogenous to the degree (1 − γ) in





















































where τ̂ is the time horizon. Then, we use as an educated guess of the following
function:
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Plugging the derivatives into equation (39), we arrive at a new PDE. The new PDE
is consistent if A1, A2 and the corresponding derivatives fullfil the following PDE
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themselves:
0 = rt +
1
2γ












The PDE (44) has to hold for all combinations of r and t. We can obtain a system of
two ordinary equations with the initial conditions A1(0) = A2(0) = 0 (cf. to Munk,
2005). The first ordinary differential equation is given by:
A
′
2 = 1− κA2(τ̂). (45)








Including the initial condition A1(0) = 0, the second ordinary differential equation
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Plugging A1 and A2 into (44) and rearranging terms, we find the following solution










































7 Appendix (B): Human Capital
Human capital can be computed as the present value of the income stream under
the Q-measure











where the survivor function S̄ includes the hazard rate under the risk neutral mea-
sure. We consider the dynamics of the function eκtrt under the Q measure:
deκtrt = e
κt(κrtdt+ [κ(r̄ − rt) + σrφr]dt)− σreκtdẑrt. (51)


























Labor dynamics under the Q measure are given by:
dyt = yt[(ζ0(t)− σy(t)ρTyPΦ + ζ1rt)dt+ σy(ρyBdẑrt + ρ̂yQdẑQt)]. (54)
Integrating, we find the following expression:




























+(ζ1 − 1)(rt − κr̄+σrφrκ )b(s− t) +
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Taking the expected value and rearranging, we get:





















ζ0(u)− σy(u)ρTyPΦ− (ζ1 − 1)σy(u)ρyBσrb(s− u)
)
du










8 Appendix (C): Numerical Methods
We solve the nonlinear PDE (37) by applying an explicit finite difference scheme
for equally spaced arrays defining the (η, r, t)-state-space. The grid points are
given as: (ηi,rj,tn | i = 1,...,I; j = 1,...,I; n = 1,...,N). For each interval, we use
some fixed positive spacing values ∆η, ∆ r, and ∆ t determining how coarse the
grid is in each dimension. We denote the approximated value function by Fi,j,n at

















Figure 2: Illustrative Coefficient Array. This illustration assumes an 5 by 5 dis-
cretization of the (η, r)-space at time N − 1. In the remainder, we will refer to this array
as matrix MN−1
Source: Author’s computations
our computational efforts, we use an upwind-scheme to stabilize the finite difference
approach. Derivatives of the first order and mixed derivatives change according
to the sign of their coefficients (+/−) in the state-space we span. Indeed this is
necessary because of the complexity we have to deal with when computing the value
function. The definitions in (58) show how we approximate the various derivatives
involved in solving the PDE in (37). For each combination (i,j) we fill out an array
we denote as matrix Mn, where n stands for the point in time. In total we obtain a
matrix Mn which is of size (IxJ ,IxJ). The matrix M has several borders where we
24
assume the state space to start or to end respectively. At each border, we adjust the
coefficient matrix by linearly extrapolating the function (37) to obtain the transition

























































Figure (2) depicts the matrix M of size (5x5,5x5) at time N − 1. As one can infer
from the graph, the matrix is only of limited bandwidth and can be easily inverted
since we want to solve the set of equations given by MnFn = dn at time n, where
the vector dn of size (IxJ,1) includes constants and future values of Fn+1. For the
optimization procedure, we use the approach described by Brennan et al. (1997)
which is similar to the controlled markov chain methods discussed in Kushner and
Dupuis (2001). In order to optimize (37), we first plug an ad-hoc guess of the optimal
controls into the PDE we want to solve for. After obtaining the value function by
means of the finite difference method, we compute the first order conditions to
find the optimal controls given the previous value function at time point n. After
obtaining the first estimate of the optimal controls, we take the new values of the
optimal controls and plough them back into the value function at same point in time
n as before. Then we solve again for the value function at time n. This iterated
process is continued until the value function has converged to its optimum. Usually,
we only need two iterative steps to find both the optimal controls and the optimized
value function. Then we can move forward to the next point in time n − 1 and do
the whole procedure over again. For our problem under consideration, we used a
state space (η, r, t) of (15,5,81) on a equidistant grid. The lower value of η is set to
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